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COMPETITION LAW AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE NEO-LIBERAL
FACTOR
David J. Gerbert
Abstract: Ordoliberalism, a particular version of European Neo-Liberal thought,
has played a central role in the relationship between competition law and trade policy
with the European Union. The substantive component of this body of thought, which is
based in Germany, emphasizes the importance of a transaction-based economy and
economic freedom; the process component emphasizes the need for juridical processes in
economic policy-making. Ordoliberalism has shaped European Union competition law
and trade policy and their roles in European integration, and its weakening may cause
major changes in that relationship.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the perceived importance of the relationship between competition
law and international trade policy has increased in recent years, discussions
have focused on two dimensions of that relationship: statements of gov-
ernment policy and patterns of conduct associated with those policies. As
important as such studies are, they seldom analyze another important com-
ponent of the picture that can provide valuable insight: the structures of
thought relating to these two areas of policy. The conceptual frameworks
and systems of ideas that influence decisions in the areas of competition law
and trade policy provide keys to understanding how each operates indi-
vidually and how they relate to each other, both in theory and in practice.
I briefly explore this dimension of the relationship between competi-
tion law and trade policy in the European Union ("EU'),' probing the
dynamics of the relationship between these two areas of decision-making
and examining the influences that shape reactions, perceptions and deci-
sions. My focus is on two components of this relationship. The first is
competition law as a component of trade policy. Competition law affects
basic structures of the market and key areas of economic conduct, and there-
fore it necessarily affects imports into the market and exports from it,
constituting a form of trade policy. The second is the influence of competi-
tion protection values on trade policy formulation and implementation.
Here the issue is the degree to which trade policy and competition law serve
the same goals.
My comments in this essay center on two claims. The first is that in
the European Union both of these aspects of the relationship between com-
petition law and trade policy revolve around one fundamental issue: how
decision-makers understand the role of law and its relationship to economic
conduct. Since the inception of the Community in 1957, there has been a
fundamental conflict between a "juridical" conception of that relationship
and a "political" conception of it, and I here sketch the dynamics of that re-
lationship.
I The terms "European Union" and "European Community" will here be used interchangeably, with
choices based on the context.
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The second claim is that a specific tradition of thought has been at the
center of this conflict and that a better understanding of that body of thought
and its influence reveals much about the current relationship between com-
petition law and trade policy in the Union. This intellectual and
institutional tradition is generally called "ordoliberalism," but I will often
refer to it more generally as "economic constitutionalism." It has been a
powerful force in economic policy thinking in general, and competition law
developments in particular, throughout the process of European integration.
Threatened changes in its role raise fundamental questions about the future
development of the relationship between competition law and trade policy
in the Union.
I will first review the central tenets of this body of thought, then
sketch its impact on competition law and trade policy and some of the rea-
sons for that influence. Finally, I will explore its role in the dynamics of
competition law and trade policy today. I Will be using the story of ordolib-
eralism as a tool for revealing patterns of influence on decisions and on the
institutional structures of decision-making.
II. ORDOLIBERALISM: A GERMAN NEO-LIBERAL VISION
Despite the enormous importance of ordoliberal thought in the EU,
this tradition has received very little attention outside of Europe and re-
mains all but unknown in the United States. 2 Moreover, except in Germany,
awareness of these ideas has been confined almost exclusively to econo-
mists. This makes it important to review briefly its main features and its
path to influence. 3
2 For exceptions, see, e.g., GERMAN NEO-LIBERALS AND THE SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY (Alan T.
Peacock & Hans Willgerodt eds., 1989); STANDARD TEXTS ON THE SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY (W. Stiltzel
et al. eds., 1982).
3 Some of the material in sections II and III of this piece is condensed and adapted from David J.
Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the "New"
Europe, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 25 (1994). The extensive footnote references in that article allow me to
minimize citations in this essay.
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A. Historical Context
Ordoliberalism was born against the background of the Weimar
Republic and the Third Reich.4 It can be seen as an attempt to find a stable
order amidst the political and economic chaos that so frequently dominated
Weimar and the destruction and totalitarianism that followed it. Ordoliberal
thinkers sought to understand and to avoid both.
The movement began during the late 1920s and 1930s as a small
group of jurists and economists began to see the relationship between law
and economics as the key to the failures of Weimar. The key figures were
the legal scholar Franz B6hm and the economist Walter Eucken. A com-
mon theme of their work was the belief that the lack of an effective,
dependable legal framework had led to economic and political disintegra-
tion in Germany and elsewhere. In particular, they believed that the
inability of the legal system to prevent the creation and misuse of private
economic power was a primary source of the problem. During the war
years, members of this group worked in relative obscurity with no access to
power, and only after the war did they become influential.
B. Perspectives and Methodology
A basic component of the ordoliberal perspective was provided by
Walter Eucken, who developed a way of thinking about economic policy
that he called "thinking in orders" (Denken in Ordnungen). As he put it,
"The perception (Erkenntnis) of economic orders (Ordnungen) is the first
step in understanding economic reality."5 The basic idea was that beneath
the complexity of economic data were fundamental ordering patterns
(orders) and that only by recognizing these patterns could one understand
the dynamics of economic phenomena.6
Eucken saw two fundamental "orders." One he called the
"transaction economy" (Verkehrswirtschaft) in which economic conduct
was organized through private, transactional decision-making. Private en-
terprises generated their own plans on the basis of their evaluation of the
4 For discussion of the formative years of the ordoliberal tradition, see id. at 28-35, ANDREAS
HEINEMANN, DIE FREIBURGER SCHULE lJND IHRE GEISTIGEN WURZELN (1989); FRrrz HOLZWARTH,
ORDNUNG DER WIRTSCHAFT DURCH WETTBEWERB (1985).
5 WALTER EUCKEN, GRUNDSATZE DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK 34 (1952).
6 See Gerber, supra note 3, at 38-43.
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incentives and disincentives created by economic competition. The second
was the centrally administered economy (Zentralverwaltungswirtschaft) in
which governmental commands organized economic activity according to
criteria external to the economic system.7 Popular versions of this distinc-
tion became commonplace in the context of the Cold War, but its contours
were far less perceptible before that time.
This systemic perspective is a key to the relationship between com-
petition law and trade policy in ordoliberal thought. Eucken's "orders"
were intellectual constructs that focused on the relationships among compo-
nents of an economic system. Certain characteristics "belonged" to a
transaction economy because they fit together in ways that necessarily in-
creased the capacity of that system to achieve its goals. For example, the
protection of economic freedom and low barriers to market entry were char-
acteristics of a transaction economy that tended to reinforce each other and,
thereby, to increase the effectiveness of the system as a whole.
Eucken then showed that the intermingling of components from these
two fundamentally incompatible "orders" in an actual economic system
necessarily impaired the functioning of that system. A transaction economy
would be harmed, for example, by each instance of governmental interven-
tion, and vice versa. Although this insight hardly seems powerful today, it
had been rarely and barely developed at the time.
C. The Problem and Its Solutions
The problem, therefore, was how to protect the transaction "order"
from harm, and here the ordoliberals saw two basic threats. One was gov-
ernmental power. Government intervention in the economy necessarily
reduced the effectiveness of the market economy, and it had to be controlled
if the transaction economy and its benefits were to be realized.
The second threat was private economic power. Where individuals or
groups had the power to influence the conduct of other market participants,
the model did not work properly. To protect the economic freedom of in-
dividuals from the power of government was not enough, because powerful
economic institutions could also destroy or limit such freedom. The or-
7 For detailed discussion, see Gernot Gutmann, Euckens Ansdize zur Theorie der
Zentralverwaltungswirtschafl und die Weiterentwicidung durch Hensel, 40 ORDO 55 (1989).
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doliberals saw this as the lesson of the Weimar period, where political and
social institutions were undermined by private economic power.8
The ordoliberal solution to these two problems was to embed the
market in a "constitutional" framework which would protect the process of
competition from distortion and minimize governmental intervention in the
economy. The centerpiece of the ordoliberal program was, therefore, the
concept of an economic constitution.9 The core idea was that a community
should make decisions about the kind of economy it wants in the same way
that it makes decisions about the political system it wants. These decisions
represent fundamental choices, and, once made, the legal system should be
required to implement them.
The effectiveness of an economic constitution depended, the ordolib-
erals said, on structuring the legal system in ways that would necessarily
implement that constitutional choice. Where a political unit chose a trans-
action economy in its economic constitution, for example, that choice
directed that governmental policies be designed to create and to maintain
that system. Ordoliberals called this "Ordnungspolitik" (order-based pol-
icy),' 0 and it required that individual governmental decisions both flow
from and be limited by the principles embodied in the economic constitu-
tion.
Ordnungspolitik also had a process dimension. In order for a trans-
action economy to achieve its goals, the governmental involvement must
itself have certain characteristics and play certain roles. Above all, govern-
ment could act only to implement the general norms or laws that derived
from the economic constitution; government officials would not have dis-
cretion to intervene in the economy except for the purpose of enforcing
those principles.
Central to this image of law is its neutrality and objectivity: the
sphere of "law" is to be outside the discretionary power of those wielding
governmental power. The state has to provide a basic level of "legal secu-
rity" (Rechtssicherheit) by assuring that law is knowable, dependable and
8 Franz Bohm's pathbreaking article on this subject was published in 1928. See Franz Bohm, Das
Problem der privaten Macht. Ein Beitragzur Monopolfrage, 3 DIE JuSTIZ 324 (1928), reprinted in FRANZ
BOHM- REDEN UND SCHRIFEN 25 (Ernst-Joachim Mestmaecker ed., 1960).
9 See Gerber, supra note 3, at 44-49.
10 This term is exceptionally difficult to translate into English, because it depends so much on the
ordoliberal thinking in which it is imbedded. The "order" in "order-based policy" is not "order" merely for
the sake of ordering, but "order" in the sense of Eucken's economic orders. That referent is not, however,
apparent in English translation.
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shielded from excessive manipulation. Moreover, government does not di-
rect the processes of the economy. It merely establishes the structural
conditions within which those processes can function effectively.
The ordoliberal program thus required that all governmental deci-
sions that might affect the economy flow from the economic constitution. 11
Its adherents repeatedly emphasized the need for an "integrated policy per-
spective" (Ganzheitsbetrachtung) in which each individual decision had to
be understood as part of a greater whole from which it received its meaning
and effect. Only thus could the program function effectively. Monetary,
social, labor and trade policy, for example, all had to flow from the same
basic principles and support each other.
D. The Roles of Competition Law and Trade Policy
For the ordoliberals, economic competition was the essence of a
transaction economy.12 The greater its role in the economy, the more effec-
tively the system functioned. Thus, the keystone of their program was a
new type of law called "competition law," which was designed to protect
competition. This ordoliberal creation has evolved into the European con-
cept of competition law, and without it the development of the European
Union is unimaginable.' 3
The ordoliberals viewed competition law as an indispensable part of
their program. Monetary and other policies designed to foster competition
would have little effect, they argued, if firms could either act in concert in
setting prices, determine output, or foreclose opportunities for competition.
For Eucken and his colleagues, history, particularly Weimar history, had
demonstrated that competition tended to collapse, because enterprises pre-
ferred private (i.e., contractual) regulation of business activities rather than
11 "All principles - the constitutive as well as the regulative - belong together. To the extent that
economic policy is consistently based on them, a competitive order will be created and made operational.
Every principle receives its meaning only in the context of the general blueprint (Bauplan) of the competi-
tive order." EUCKEN, supra note 5, at 304.
12 Eucken's concern was not with competition in the loose sense found in common usage, but with a
specific form of competition, namely, "perfect" or "complete" competition -that is, competition in which
no firm in a market has power to coerce conduct by other firms in that market The concept was not new to
Eucken, but he gave it a new function. See Gerber, supra note 3, at 43.
13 The originality of this competition law idea is often overlooked, but to do so undervalues its im-
portance and influence. For discussion, see id. at 62-64.
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competition and because enterprises were frequently able to acquire such
high levels of economic power they could eliminate competition.
The ordoliberals conceived competition law as a means of preventing
this degeneration of the competitive process.14 Competition law would
"enforce" competition by creating and maintaining the conditions under
which it would flourish. Economic science would establish the general
principles, and an independent monopoly office would enforce those prin-
ciples. This fundamentally new concept flowed from the conceptual
framework of ordoliberalism and rested on its theoretical underpinnings.
Its focus was the problem of private economic power. From the
ordoliberal perspective, such power necessarily threatened the competitive
process, and the primary function of competition law was to eliminate it or
at least to prevent its harmful effects. They sought to prohibit or to elimi-
nate monopoly positions because their very existence distorted the
competitive order.' 5 Recognizing that economic power positions were, to
some degree, inevitable, the ordoliberals then developed the concept of "as-
if' conduct controls.16 The idea was that one could use economic analysis
to determine what range of conduct would be possible under conditions of
perfect or complete competition, and any conduct by a powerful firm that
fell outside that range would be prohibited. It was the core of the notion of
abuse of a market-dominating position that is found in article 86 of the
Rome Treaty and in virtually all European competition laws.
The ordoliberal program required a specific institutional framework
for creating, applying and enforcing its substantive provisions. In it, the
legislature would enact competition laws based on the economic constitu-
tion, an independent monopoly office would assure compliance with that
law, and, where necessary, the judiciary would supervise interpretation of
the principles by the cartel office. The executive branch of government
would play virtually no role in this scheme. The monopoly office would
14 See, e.g., FRANZ BOHM, WETTBEWERB UND MONOPOLKAMPF 363-70 (1933).
15 The demand for an absolute prohibition of horizontal agreements was closely associated with the
ordoliberals (particularly Franz Btlhm). See generally David J. Gerber, Law and the Abuse of Economic
Power in Europe, 62 TULANE L. REV. 57, 64-66 (1987) [hereinafter Gerber, Abuse of Economic Power].
16 Leonhard Miksch, a leading student of Walter Eucken, was chiefly responsible for elaborating and
refining this idea. See, e.g., LEONHARD MIKSCH, WETTBEWERB ALS AUFGABE: GRUNDSATZE EINER
WETrBEWERBSORDNUNG (2d ed. 1947); Die Wirischaftspolitik des Als Ob, 105 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE
GESAMTE STAATSwIssENScHAFT 310 (1949). Not all ordoliberals were enthusiastic about the "as-if' stan-
dard.
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apply legal principles according to objective standards; there was not sup-
posed to be any "discretion."
From an ordoliberal perspective, international trade policy played the
same role in the international economy that competition law played in the
domestic economy.17 The same principles informed both sets of policies.
Just as competition law was to remove obstacles to domestic competition,
trade policy was to remove obstacles to trade among nations. In general,
governments would not be allowed to control imports or to subsidize their
own industries, except as provided by the general principles of the eco-
nomic constitution.
E. Ordoliberalism's Role in Germany
Experience with ordoliberal ideas in Germany was critical to their
impact in the European Community. Their pervasive influence on German
policymakers within Community institutions provided the conduit for these
ideas, and Germany's economic success was the driving force. The small
band of ordoliberals emerged from obscurity during the immediate postwar
period, and many played leading roles in occupied Germany.' 8 They were
among the few qualified Germans who were not tainted by ties to Nazism,
and thus they met the rigorous United States' denazification standards.
Moreover, their positions on economic and political issues comported well
with those of the United States occupation authorities, who liked their mar-
ket orientation and agreed with them that the high levels of cartelization of
German industry had contributed to Hitler's political success. 19
By the early 1950s, ordoliberal ideas had become generally popular.
The ordoliberals' promise of a clear set of guidelines that would constrain
both government and private economic power, while producing rapid eco-
nomic growth became intertwined with the program for a "social market
economy." The "social market economy" has dominated the evolution of
German thought and attitudes about economy and society ever since. With
the economic and political successes of this program during the 1950s, or-
doliberal concepts increasingly became part of the basic vocabulary of
17 See generally GERMAN NEO-LIBERALS AND THE SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 2.
18 See Gerber, supra note 3, at 57-62.
19 See generally REINHARD BLUM, SOZIALE MARKTWIRTSCHAFr: WIRTSCHAFrSPOLIT1K ZWISCHEN
NEOLIBERALISMUS UND ORDOLIBERALISMUS 184-215 (1969).
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policymakers throughout German government. By the end of the decade,
just as European Community institutions were taking shape, ordoliberal per-
spectives, values and assumptions had become part of the orthodoxy of
political and economic thought in Germany.
The enactment of a competition law was an important part of this
program. For almost a decade after the war, the competition law issue was a
focus of political and economic discussion in Germany. In 1956, the Law
Against Restraints on Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbs-
beschrankungen) ("GWB") was finally enacted.20 The basic structures and
the vocabulary of the act, which is still in effect, reflect strong ordoliberal
influence. 21 The nearly decade-long public debate surrounding the passage
of the GWB and the experience in implementing those provisions made
German policymakers familiar with competition law issues to an extent not
available to other European countries.
F Ordoliberalism and European Neo-Liberalism
Before turning to the role of ordoliberal thought in the European
Community, it is important to note ordoliberalism's ties to other forms of
neo-liberal thought in Europe. German neo-liberal thought influenced poli-
cymakers in many parts of Europe during the post-war period, and
ordoliberals (such as Wilhelm R6pke in Switzerland) and those much influ-
enced by ordoliberalism (such as Friedrich Hayek in England) were often at
the center of the revival of this neo-liberal tradition.22 Moreover, there were
indigenous strains of neo-liberalism in other countries that tended to be-
come interwoven with the German variety. It was the German neo-liberals
who provided the best-developed methodology for achieving neo-liberal
goals, but these ties to other neo-liberals were critical to their success in
Community institutions.
20 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen [GWB], 1957 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI.] 1081. The
leading commentary on German competition law is ULRICH IMMENGA AND ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMACKER,
KOMMENTARZUM GWB (2d ed. 1992).
21 Substantively, the GWB generally prohibits cartels, and it includes a variety of measures aimed at
preventing the abuse of economic power, including the quintessentially ordoliberal "as-if" conduct stan-
dard. The law's application and enforcement mechanism also follows ordoliberal prescriptions; it creates a
relatively autonomous office (the Bundeskartellamt - FCO) to enforce the law and virtually excludes pri-
vate antitrust suits.
22 See Gerber, supra note 3, at 31-32, 70-71.
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Im. ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
We can now focus on the roles of ordoliberal ideas in the European
Union, particularly their impact on the relationship between competition
law and international trade. Those roles have been little discussed outside
of Germany, in part because it has not been considered politically appropri-
ate to talk about national sources of influence within the Community, but
they have influenced the relationship between competition law and trade
policy on several levels.
A. Economic Constitutionalism and the Decision-Making Process
The most fundamental level involves basic structures and assump-
tions of decision-making. Ordoliberals and their ideas were critical in
establishing the conception that the Rome Treaty represented a constitu-
tional structure in which juridical processes (i.e., the reasoned application of
general principles by "objective" decision-makers) should dominate deci-
sion-making. This conception of the role of law is a key to the relationship
between competition law and trade policy.
Viewing the Treaty of Rome as a "constitutional framework" for de-
cision-making has become the dominant perspective in recent years, and
thus many are unaware or have forgotten that at the treaty's inception few
viewed it that way.23 From the earliest years of the Community, this consti-
tutionalist conception of decision-making has vied for influence with an
explicitly political conception of the decision-making process that I will
here call the industrial policy conception. From this perspective, law is seen
primarily as an instrument of policy which political powerholders wield in
response to political and economic exigencies and pressure from their con-
stituents.
At the outset, the conflict between these two basic views of the deci-
sional process was open and confrontational, and through the mid-1960s,
the industrial policy conception was an important rival of economic consti-
tutionalism. 24 Support for it was particularly strong among French officials,
23 For general discussion of the process of "constitution-making" in the EU, see Eric Stein, Lawyers,
Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981).
24 See generally Gerber, Abuse of Economic Power, supra note 15, at 64-66.
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many of whom were at the time imbued with the ideas and culture of
planification and dirigisme.25
Ordoliberals and their ideas were critically important in the gradual
ascendance of economic constitutionalism over industrial policy thinking in
many areas of Community activity.26 In particular, the German officials
who were in leading positions within the commission continually and pow-
erfully propagated this conception of the decision-making process. The
most important of these may have been Walter Hallstein, the first president
of the European Commission. Hallstein had been a professor of law in
Germany before the war and had become a committed follower of ordolib-
eral ideas in the years after the war. Ordoliberal conceptions of the rule of
law and the economic constitution within the Community pervade his
speeches and writings, 27 as with those of virtually all other Germans in key
positions within the Community.28
These personal influences combined with growing appreciation of the
integrative utility of such decisional processes, increasing respect for the
successes of the German social market economy, and a changed political
situation in France to allow economic constitutionalism to gain ever greater
influence. Today, ordoliberal ideas have become an important component
of the culture of both the commission and the court. For example, they
contribute to the emphasis on protecting the neutrality and objectivity of
decision-makers, the establishment of quasi-judicial procedures and stan-
dards for decision-making, and the general demand that decisions be
justified by reference to legal principles rather than merely to political inter-
ests. The industrial policy conception has remained, however, a contestant
.for influence in all areas and a powerful force in some. As we shall see, its
fortunes appear to be improving.29
25 For discussion of French economic planning see Henri Guillaume, Implications of the New
Indicative Planning, in FRENCH INDUSTRIAL POLICY 119, 124-26 (William J. Adams & Christian Stoffaes
eds., 1986).
26 For discussion, see Gerber, supra note 3, at 69-72.
27 See, eg., WALTER HALLSTEIN, EUROPE IN THE MAKING 28 (1972) ("What the Community is in-
tegrating is the role of the state in establishing the framework within which economic activity takes
place2;I See, e.g., ALFRED MOLLER-ARMACK, AUF DEM WEG NACH EUROPA (1971).
29 See infra part V.
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B. Ordoliberalism and Competition Law: Characteristics of EU
Competition Law
The influence of ordoliberalism has been strongest in the area of
competition law, which has served as a kind of anchor for ordoliberal ideas
within the Community. Competition law has been a motor of European in-
tegration, and it is here that economic constitutionalist thought has played
its most prominent roles.30
This influence has been due in large measure to the primary role of
German nationals in developing the competition law system. As the institu-
tions of the Community were being created, some form of competition law
was generally considered necessary to prevent the erection of private barri-
ers to cross-boundary trade. There was, however, very little relevant
experience in Europe with such problems, except in Germany, where com-
petition law issues had been a major focus of attention for almost a decade
and a sophisticated competition law had recently been established. Thus,
German officials came to play the central role in shaping the European
competition law system.3 1 These officials sought to fashion a system that
reflected ordoliberal ideas and German experience with competition law,
and the EU competition law system reflects this influence in both its proce-
dural and substantive structures.
The most fundamental issue in creating the competition law system
was the conflict between economic constitutionalism and industrial policy.
In the early years of the Community two quite different images of competi-
tion law drawn from fundamentally different national experiences
confronted each other. German participants tended to view the competition
law system as fundamentally juridical. For them, the primary guide to de-
cision-making should be legal analysis. They saw the objectivity and
neutrality of the juridical process as necessary for achieving any effective
progress toward integration and for establishing the legitimacy of competi-
tion law decisions.
The French viewed competition law as a component of industrial
policy; it was, in essence, a political process in which the national interests
30 For further discussion of the evolution of Union competition law, see David J. Gerber, The
Transformation of European Community Competition Law?, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 97 (1994) [hereinafter
Gerber, Transformation].
31 See generally Gerber, supra note 3, at 73-74.
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of the member states were to be protected and maximized. Decisional out-
comes were to be primarily determined by the interplay of the political and
economic interests of the member states.
Largely due to German influence, the juridical conception gradually
prevailed during the early 1960s.32 The internal processes of the competi-
tion directorate ("DGIV") were designed to provide objectivity and at least
quasi-judicial decision-making procedures. In particular, decision-makers
within the system were encouraged to understand their decisions as the
application of legal principles rather than the result of political compro-
mises.
The influence of ordoliberalism within DGIV has also been institu-
tionalized. For example, the competition directorate is virtually always
headed by a German national, thus cemeriting close ties between German
and EU competition law. Moreover, ordoliberal ideas have become part of
the culture of decision-making in DGIV. Competition law has come to be
seen primarily as a juridical system in which norms generated by the com-
mission and Union courts (the European Court of Justice and the Court of
First Instance) provide authoritative guidelines for decision-making.
The interpenetration of German and EU competition law is also ap-
parent at the substantive level. Concepts developed in German competition
law frequently find their way into the competition law of the Community,
and an understanding of German competition law concepts is often valuable
for understanding Community competition law.33
C. Economic Constitutionalism and Trade Policy
Economic constitutionalism has never played the predominant role in
trade policy that it has played in competition law, but its roles have nonethe-
less been significant.34 Its influence was more important during the
formative period of the Community than it is today, but procedures estab-
lished during that period generally remain in place, and the associated
32 The procedural framework of the competition law system was, for example, created during the
early 1960s by a committee headed by Arved Deringer, a German lawyer and member of the European
Parliament. For discussion, see D. G. GOYDER, EEC COMPETITION LAW 31-43 (1988).
33 See, e.g., Gerber, Abuse of Economic Power, supra note 15, at 93-94.
34 For discussion of the process of trade policy formulation and implementation in the EU, see J. P.
HAYES, MAKING TRADE POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1993).
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attitudes and expectations often continue to color and to channel decision-
making.
There is, for example, pressure to justify trade decisions by reference
to coniceptions of fairness and to fundamental principles of the Union's eco-
nomic order. Accordingly, in seeking to influence trade policy decisions, it
is usually not enough for a country or a group of countries merely to allege
harm to domestic enterprises. There is a presumption that such decisions
must be justified on principled grounds. These principles of decision are
often quite vague (e.g., fairness or "community interest"), and the presump-
tion is often not applied in cases that have important political implications.
Nevertheless, in many areas the decisional process operates, and is con-
strained by, juridical forms and discourse. This is notably so, for example,
in regard to anti-dumping law, one of the central components of trade
policy.35
, The substantive analog to this process factor in trade policy formula-
tion is the proposition that purely protectionist decisions should generally
be seen as inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Union.36
There is a presumption that such decisions should not be allowed except
under special circumstances. There are many examples of protectionist de-
cisions, but there is also a discourse that requires that protectionist decisions
be justified as exceptions to the general principles of economic constitu-
tionalism, and this alone limits protectionist pressures.
IV. ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
COMPETITION LAW AND TRADE POLICY
This brief look at the roles of economic constitutionalism in competi-
tion law and trade policy in the EU reveals the degree to which the
economic constitutionalist perspective has shaped the relationship, between
these two areas. In essence, it has provided a set of procedural and substan-
tive principles which tend to integrate the two areas of decision-making.
The central principle of ordoliberalism that policy decisions should flow
from the same constitutional framework is at the core of the relationship.
35 See generally MARIO MARQUE MENDES, ANTITRUST IN A WORLD OF INTERRELATED ECONOMIES:
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN ANTITRUST POLICIES IN THE US AND THE EEC 167-77, 193-97 (1991).
36 See generally Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, Antitrust and Trade Policy: A Peaceful Coexistence?
European Community Perspective-I, 17 INT'L BUS. LAW. 58 (1989).
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A. Competition Law as Trade Policy
This integrating influence has been particularly evident in structuring
competition law's role as a component of trade policy. The issue is whether
competition law is used in ways that distort trade and investment flows
across the Union's external borders; it is at the center of current interna-
tional controversies about the relationship between competition law and
trade policy. In the EU, the interplay of the substantive and process com-
ponents of economic constitutionalism has tended to limit the use of
competition law for protectionist and other trade manipulation purposes.
The substantive component of economic constitutionalism demands
that competition law serve the basic political decision in favor of free mar-
kets and a transaction economy. Therefore, its function is to advance the
cause of competition generally (or universally), not merely within a particu-
lar jurisdiction or polity. This conception has been a potent force in making
EU competition law a broad, general system for protecting competition
rather than one whose sole purpose is to reduce trade barriers among
Member States. So conceived, competition law's substantive goals are
directed against protectionist decisions.
The process factor in economic constitutionalism helps to effectuate
this substantive policy. The ordoliberal demand that law, especially com-
petition law, be understood in constitutional and juridical rather than
instrumental and political terms has been the operative notion in this regard.
In this view, the competition law system must be structured so as to imple-
ment the principles of the economic constitution and to prevent its use to
achieve short-term political objectives. Following this precept, officials
within DGIV have fashioned a competition law system whose decisional
processes in themselves provide constraints on industrial policy and protec-
tionist forces.
The requirement that decisions be based primarily on the juridical
application of general principles tends, for example, to inhibit discrimina-
tion against foreign firms. The decisional process constrains decision-
makers to apply the same principles to foreign firms that they apply to do-
mestic firms (i.e., those within the Union). Any significant tendency to use
competition law to favor domestic firms would be quickly apparent because
VOL. 4 No. I
MAR. 1995 COMPETITION LA WAND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 53
decisions are presented as public statements of the relationship between
specific fact constellations and the relevant principles.
The decisional system undergirds this impact in other ways. For ex-
ample, its procedures reduce the administrative discretion in which
protectionist impulses thrive. Administrative decision-makers are subject to
the requirement that decisions be based on juridical methodology. The
culture of decision-making requires that they not make judgments primarily
on the basis of political expediency. In the relatively infrequent situations
in which competition law decisions may have important political ramifica-
tions, potential pressures on administrative officials are deflected to the
commission as a whole, which may and often does take political factors into
account in making final decisions.
The decisional process thus does not eliminate all protectionist influ-
ences. Such factors undoubtedly have played roles in specific competition
law decisions; they are inevitable, and, in any event, typically unknowable.
What is important here is that the discourse and structures of decision-
making in competition law tend to restrain their impact.
B. Pro-competition Values in Trade Policy
If we look at the influence of pro-competition values on trade policy
decisions, which is the second aspect of the relationship between competi-
tion law and trade policy that we are reviewing, the same themes reappear.
Economic constitutionalism's unique intermingling of process requirements
and substantive values has been a major factor in giving force to competi-
tion values in trade policy, although the influence of economic
constitutionalism has been weaker here than in competition law, and, corre-
spondingly, the influence of pro-competition values has remained more
attenuated.
Economic constitutionalism's substantive demands have been impor-
tant in requiring that the competition protection values be represented in
trade policy decisions. These demands are anchored in article 110 of the
Rome Treaty, which provides that the EU's "common commercial policy ..
contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world
trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and the
lowering of customs barriers." Although there is controversy about the
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the degree to which this provision binds decision-makers, 37 the important
point is that it is the established policy of the Union to move toward trade
liberalization.
Process factors provide important means for giving at least some de-
gree of force to this injunction, and they necessarily play an important role
in fostering competition values in the trade policy area. The EU's mecha-
nism for responding to international dumping is, for example, structured
largely along juridical rather than political lines. Decision-makers are to
apply general principles of law to the facts of cases that have been presented
and argued within a juridical framework. Thus, they are required to pay
heed to competition issues as part of juridical proceedings in which today's
decisions are considered in making tomorrow's decisions and charges of in-
consistency can have serious ramifications.
V. LAW, POLITICS AND THE DECLINE OF ECONOMIC
CONSTITUTIONALISM?
While the focus of this piece has been on the role of economic consti-
tutionalism in shaping the relationship between competition law and trade
policy in the European Union, the potential relevance of this analysis for
current policy issues also deserves comment. If, as I suggest, economic
constitutionalism has helped to shape that relationship in ways that reduce
protectionist and industrial policy forces, what happens if the influence of
economic constitutionalism wanes?
A. The Uncertain Future of Economic Constitutionalism
The pressures on economic constitutionalism are clearly increasing
and are likely to continue to increase. In particular, the virtual completion
of the 1992 program has made intra-Union trade almost free, allowing
products that are imported into one of the member states to circulate freely
within other member states. This increases the incentives for member states
to seek protection against imports from outside the Union. With little re-
maining authority to protect their industries, their governments must turn to
the Union for such protection.
37 See, eg., Bourgeois, supra note 36, at 59.
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On many levels there is evidence of the increasing force of industrial
policy thinking in Union decision-making. The Single European Act of
1986 explicitly introduced industrial policy factors into the Treaty of Rome
by adding Article 130f. Article 130f includes in the explicit goals of the
Community the strengthening of European industry and "the development
of its international competitiveness," 38 and the Treaty on European Union
(the Maastricht Treaty) has continued this trend.39
The vulnerability of economic constitutionalism has become apparent
even in its bastion, competition law.40 One example dramatically demon-
strates the extent of industrial policy pressures. In late 1991 the
Community's merger control regulation had been in effect for almost two
years, and some sixty-five mergers had been noticed under its provisions
without commission disapproval. This lack of action had led to widespread
speculation that the commission did not have the political courage actually
to use the regulation to prohibit a merger. In October of 1991, however, the
court issued an order prohibiting a merger involving a Canadian corpora-
tion, De Havilland and a French/Italian consortium.41 The French and
Italian governments protested vehemently that the Commission had been
overly legalistic in applying the statute and should have paid greater heed to
industrial policy factors in applying the Regulation. Since then the
Commission has not prohibited any mergers.
B. Possible Consequences
If economic constitutionalism loses force, we can expect significant
changes in the relationship between competition law and trade policy, at
least with respect to the areas I have been discussing. That tradition of
thought has provided key intellectual and institutional ties between these
two areas, and its attenuation would reduce the force of these ties, with po-
38 For discussion, see Manfred Caspari, Zur Abgrenzung von Industriepolitik und Wettbewerbspolitik
der EG, in ,VETrBEWERBSFRAGEN DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 9, 12-13 (Helmut Gr6ner ed.,
1990).
39 For discussion, see Henning Klodt, Europdische Industriepolitik nach Maastricht, 3 DIE
WELTWIRTSCHAFT 263 (1992).
40 See generally Gerber, Transformation, supra note 30, at 124-37.
41 See generally Andrew Wachtman, The European Community Commission de Havilland Decision:
Potential Problems in Community Merger Control are Realized, 21 CAPITAL L. REv. 685 (1992); Michael
J. Reynolds, The de Havilland Case: A Watershed for EC Merger Control, 10 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 21
(1991).
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tentially far-reaching consequences. In particular, it would probably allow
industrial policy and protectionist forces to play larger roles in both com-
petition law and trade policy.
One likely consequence of reduced influence for economic constitu-
tionalism would be a diminished role for competition law in the Union and
thus also for competition protection values in other areas such as trade pol-
icy. The appeal of economic constitutionalism has contributed to the
competition law system's role as a motor of European integration.
Moreover, competition values have enjoyed a high degree of respect in the
EU, and DGIV officials have been particularly influential within the com-
mission. A weakening of economic constitutionalism would be likely to
undermine these roles.
If the force of economic constitutionalism wanes, this is also likely to
impair the institutional processes that were built on its assumptions and that
have been so important in combating protectionist tendencies. Particularly
in competition law, the decisional process has been structured according to
the economic constitutionalist mandate that decisions should be based on
the application of general principles. This structure has been a key to the
impact and the successes of competition law, and a weakening of that
structure may well significantly impair its efficacy.
The waning of economic constitutionalism would tend to make the
process less transparent, and outcomes less predictable. A constitutionalist
process demands a high degree of openness in the presentation of arguments
and in the public statement of grounds for decision. This generally in-
creases the ability to predict decisional outcomes by restricting the range of
acceptable outcomes.
A decline in the force of economic constitutionalism would similarly
tend to increase the range of discretion on the part of administrative deci-
sion-makers. By reducing incentives to base decisions on the application of
juridical principles, it would encourage administrative decision-makers to
respond to other political and personal incentives. This would provide in-
centives for increased political instrumentalization of both competition law
and trade policy. Given the political force behind protectionist demands,
this is likely to be in the service of protectionist goals.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this piece I have tried to illuminate the central role of economic
constitutionalist thought in structuring the relationship between competition
law and trade policy in the European Union. This body of thought and the
institutional processes which it has shaped have been at the core of this re-
lationship, and thus understanding their roles reveals much about how this
relationship operates today and how it may change in the future.
My comments on the role of economic constitutionalism have fo-
cused on it not only as an historical force, but also as an analytical factor
that can be used to develop insights into the situation facing the Union and
the world today. The origins of these ideas are in themselves not of primary
importance in this context, but their influence and the potential conse-
quences of its diminution are, and they deserve greater attention than they
have received.

